Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format
I. Introduction
This paper studies the bidding behavior in a multi-object uniform price auction, under both the sealed-bid and open formats. The context of our study is the Vehicle Quota System (VQS) in Singapore, which was implemented in May 1990. Under the VQS, a prospective car buyer must first obtain a vehicle quota license, referred to as a Certificate of Entitlement (or more commonly, COE). Each quota license allows a vehicle to be on the roads for ten years. Until June 2001, the vehicle licenses were allocated through a sealedbid uniform price auction that was held monthly. A important result in auction theory is the revenue equivalence theorem, which states that if identical objects are auctioned in a simultaneous auction where the set of winners are those who submit the highest bids, and where valuations are independent and participants are risk-neutral, then it does not matter whether the auction is conducted in a sealed-bid format or as in an open format. The revenue equivalence theorem, as first proven in Vickrey (1961) , and subsequently generalized in Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) , implies that all standard auctions, such as the first-price sealed-bid auction (where each winner pays his own bid), the second price sealed-bid auction (where the winners pay the highest rejected bid), the open outcry ascending (English) auction, or the open outcry descending (Dutch) auction are equivalent in terms of the expected revenue generated for each object auctioned.
However, if the assumptions of independent valuations or risk neutrality do not hold, then the different auctions rank differently in terms of their expected revenue generated per object put up for auction. Specifically, when the participants in an auction are risk-averse but valuations are independent, a first-price sealed-bid auction will generate higher revenue than an open uniform-price auction (as shown in Maskin and Riley, 1984) .
The intuition behind this result is that if individuals are risk-averse, they would bid more aggressively in a sealed-bid auction to increase the probability of winning, by giving up some of the net payoff conditional on winning an allocation.
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On the other hand, if bidders are risk-neutral and valuations are not independent, but affiliated 3 so that there is a common-value element in the bidders' valuations, the second-price open (i.e. ascending English outcry) auctions will generate higher expected revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction, which in turn, dominates the first-price sealed-bid auction. The underlying principle at work here is the greater informational linkage among bidders in the open auction format that allows bidders to revise their valuations as the auction takes place (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982) . A recent paper that 2
Since the second-price sealed-bid auction is strategically equivalent to the uniform-price open auction, bidding one's valuation is the dominant strategy in both cases. Hence, even if participants are risk averse, the revenue equivalence principle continues to hold for the second-price auctions when bidders' valuations are private values.
3 Roughly speaking, if one bidder observes a favorable signal regarding some relevant aspect of the bidding environment, it makes the conditional probability of favorable values for the other relevant aspects more likely. The practical implication for bidding behavior under the VQS is that if a participant in the quota license auction is willing to submit a higher bid because he observes a signal that demand for cars is likely to be higher (due to, say, seasonal demand), then he should think that other bidders are also prepared to do so. In other words, if one bidder forecasts a higher price, then he should expect that other bidders should also forecast higher prices.
examines the revenue equivalence hypothesis in an experimental context is Chew and Nishimura (2003) .
In the context of the quota license auctions in Singapore, the valuation of a vehicle license is not strictly private value, since the bids that car buyers are willing to submit, through the car dealers, are dependent on the expected vehicle demand in each auction, the available quota in future auctions, as well as the outlook on the economy, etc. Hence, if car buyers are risk averse and the valuations that they place on vehicle licenses are affiliated, the switch of the quota license auction from a sealed-bid format to an open online format should produce an empirical difference in the bidding behavior and the revenue generated per quota license. This provides the motivation for our study in this paper.
To study if revenue equivalence holds, we constructed an econometric model for Although a number of studies have been conducted to assess the equity and efficiency of the VQS -among them, Phang (1993) , Koh and Lee (1994) , Phang, Wong and Chia (1996) , Chin and Smith (1997) , Tan (2001) and Koh (2003) -this paper is the first to test if revenue equivalence holds for Singapore's quota auction.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the VQS in Singapore. Section III discusses the issues involved in modeling the vehicle quota license auctions. Section IV presents the econometric model and discusses the results from the forecasting exercise and its implications for testing if revenue equivalence holds. Section V concludes the paper.
II. The Vehicle Quota System in Singapore
The VQS was introduced in May 1990 to control the growth of the motor vehicle for motorcycles; Category 7, an "Open" category for registration of all types of vehicles.
Every quota year beginning in May, the quota for new vehicles is determined based on the target growth rate in the car population and the forecast number of de-registrations.
The Land Transport Authority of Singapore (LTA) releases on its website (http://www.lta.gov.sg) the exact calculations for the target vehicle population and the number of licenses available for auction each month. 4 The projected quota for each category is allocated equally over twelve months. To allow flexibility in the composition of the vehicle population, 25% of the deregistered vehicles in each category are allotted to the "Open" category, where the licenses can be used to register vehicles belonging to any category.
Since 1990, the VQS has undergone a number of modifications. Some of the major changes include: (i) the quota licenses were initially transferable but made non-transferable following public anger over speculative activities; (ii) a "weekend" car quota license category was also introduced in May 1991, but discontinued in 1994 due to lack of popularity; (iii) the number of quota categories was reduced to five in 1999 with the merger - The market-clearing bid is the lowest successful bid. As there many participants in the license auctions, the distribution of bids is approximately continuous; hence, the lowest successful bid is generally be close to the highest rejected bid, so that the license auction is a second-price auction. Although a license auction may be over-subscribed, not all the quota licenses may be allocated. This is because there is no tie-breaking procedure for identical bids at the market-clearing level. These bids are treated as unsuccessful bids, and the next highest bid sets the license premium. The unallocated licenses are carried over to the next auction.
As Tables 1 and 2 show the average quota license premiums and its volatility, respectively. The calculations were based on an exchange rate of US$1 to S$1.75.
III. Modeling the Quota License Auction
We briefly discuss the main considerations in modeling the quota license auctions.
First, we note that the VQS is an example of an affiliated-values repeated multiple-object auction. In other words, the valuations of bidders and the sealed bids that they submit have a common-value element. The participants in these auctions form expectations about the intensity of demand in each auction, based on their assessment of the economic environment and the anticipated vehicle demand in the current and future auctions.
Bidders' beliefs and expectations, as well as their decision to participate in a particular auction, may be based on both private information and public information (such as the outlook on economic growth and interest rates, changes in government policies, and modifications to vehicle quota system, etc.).
Additionally, announcements of changes in future license quotas will lead to revisions in the expectations of future quota premiums, and this will affect bidders' decision to participate in a particular auction -either postponing participation or bringing forward the participation. Auction participants may also study the bid distributions of previous auctions (available from September 1994 to June 2001 for the sealed-bid format).
Conditional on the public information and their private information, each car buyer computes his valuations for the quota licenses in each auction. As shown in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Klemperer (1999) , for second-price auctions with affiliated valuations, each player's optimal strategy is to bid as if as he is the marginal successful bidder. Therefore, if risk aversion among car buyers is small, an application of the results of Milgrom and Weber (1982) should lead us to expect that the switch to the open online auction format for the vehicle license auction (which is akin to an English outcry secondprice auction) will produce a higher expected revenue per license compared with the sealed-bid second-price quota license auction. However, if risk aversion among car buyers is significant, this will produce a countervailing effect as the switch to an open-online auction, by producing greater transparency will lead to less aggressive bidding. 5 These issues are discussed in more details in Koh and Lee (1994) and Koh (2003) .
IV. Econometric Analysis
Our study focuses on the period from January 1996 The forecasting model is constructed as follows. The demand for vehicle licenses is a function of car demand, which is in turn influenced by the macro-economic environment.
The appropriate macro-economic indicators to use are Singapore's industrial production and non-oil exports; these are reported on a monthly basis and impact the economic outlook, consumer confidence and purchasing behavior. Other variables used to construct the econometric model are the interest rate differentials of the 3-month commercial bank paper and the 5-year Singapore government bond, against the 3-month Singapore Treasury bill rates. The use of bond-bill spread and paper-bill spread as a predictor of economic activity has been documented by Stock and Watson (1989) , Bernanke (1990) , Friedman and Knutter (1992) , Harvey (1991 Harvey ( , 1997 and Tse (1998) . We consider the first-order differences in the monthly license premiums as function of the interest rate differentials and the first-order differences in the non-oil exports and the industrial production indices. and 6 (motorcycles) from our study, as these categories are largely for commercial purposes.
As we noted earlier, in May 1999, Categories 1 and 2 were merged to form Category A, while Categories 3 and 4 were merged to form Category B. Category 7 was renamed as Category E. For the purpose of data continuity, we have decided to calculate, for the period of January 1996 to April 1999, an index of the quota license premiums for 
Results
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3 Table 4 .
We checked the robustness of the econometric model under the sealed-bid system as follows. We estimated the model for 58 observations, from September 1994 to As is evident from Table 4 , the forecast errors are negative for all three quota categories, and are statistically significant at the 5% level for Categories B and E. The results suggest that revenue equivalence does not hold following the switch from the sealed-bid format to the open online format. The switch in the auction format appeared to have produced a dampening impact on the auction revenue per license.
The results suggest that by providing greater transparency, the open online format also led to less aggressive bidding in the license auctions. A plausible explanation that is consistent with this result is that risk aversion among bidders is significant, so that bidding behavior had been particularly aggressive under the sealed-bid format of the license auctions. Table 5 -
Concluding Comments
Since the VQS was introduced in 1990, it has been suggested many times by the Singaporean public for a change in the format of the quota license auction from a sealedbid format to an open format. The basic argument put forward was that the sealed-bid format puts car buyers at a disadvantage as they were not able to learn about the market conditions and bid appropriately. As a result, car buyers typically delegated the bidding decision to the car distributors, who determined the bids to submit, on behalf of the car buyers. In fact, the common practice is for car dealers to offer a bundled package, with a "subsidy" for a quota license if the car buyer lets the dealer bid on his behalf. Notes:
1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.
2. As Categories 1 and 2 were merged to form Category A in April 1999, an index of the quota license premiums for Categories 1 and 2, weighted by the number of quota licenses in each category, is constructed to proxy for a "Category A" license premium over the period January 1996 to April 1999,. A similar index is constructed for Categories 3 and 4 over the same period for a "Category B" license premium. Note:
The forecast error in quota license premium is calculated by comparing the predicted quota license premiums and the actual license premiums. If revenue equivalence holds, the forecast errors should be statistically insignificant. The estimated revenue impact is calculated by taking the forecast error and multiplying it by the number of vehicle licenses allocated each month.
